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WHITMAN AND THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
CONUNDRUM
Lisa M. Fairfax*
INTRODUCTION
While the law on insider trading has been convoluted and, in Judge Jed S.
Rakoff’s words, “topsy turvy,”1 the law on insider trading is supposedly clear
on at least one point: insider trading liability is premised upon a fiduciary
relationship. Thus, all three seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases articulating
the necessary elements for demonstrating any form of insider trading liability
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 made
crystal clear that a fiduciary relationship represented the lynchpin for such
liability.3
Alas, insider trading law is not clear about the source from which the
fiduciary relationship arises.4 Some insist that the source is federal law,
while others insist that it is some aspect of state law.5 Twenty-five years ago,
Professor Stephen Bainbridge emphasized the relative lack of attention
focused on this source question, noting that such inattentiveness “robbed the
federal insider trading prohibition of coherence and predictability.”6

* Alexander Hamilton Professor of Business Law, The George Washington University Law
School. This Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Securities and Consumer
Litigation—Pathways and Hurdles, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Institute for
Law and Economic Policy on February 28, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law.
Special thanks to Judge Jed S. Rakoff for his searching inquiries into insider trading issues
and passionate dedication to the law. Thanks to Judge Gerard E. Lynch, John Coffee, Jill
Fisch, Donald C. Langevoort, Robert Rothman, and Audra Soloway for their comments on
earlier versions of this Article and to Nickolas Kinslow for invaluable research assistance. I
would also like to thank the Fordham Law Review editors for all their hard work on this piece.
All errors, of course, are mine.
1. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555
F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014); Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 928, 931 (2014) (referencing insider trading law as a “theoretical mess,” “seriously
flawed,” “ill-defined,” and “astonishingly dysfunctional”).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq.
3. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1323–36 (2009).
4. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
5. See SEC v. Mapp, 240 F. Supp. 3d 569, 582 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (noting a federal circuit
split on this issue).
6. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1995).
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Nevertheless, this inattentiveness persists, causing debate about the source to
periodically remerge.
In United States v. Whitman,7 Judge Rakoff sought to settle this debate in
favor of federal law.8 While the Second Circuit affirmed the holding,9 other
federal and state courts contend that the source of the fiduciary relationship
stems from state law.10
This Article agrees with the result in Whitman but nevertheless argues that
pinpointing appropriate rationales for the result is challenging primarily
because the insider trading regime is riddled with mixed signals. On the one
hand, as Judge Rakoff notes, the notion that state law should define the
fiduciary relationship is highly problematic not only because of the potential
variance from state to state11 but also because of the considerable uncertainty
regarding which state law controls the fiduciary relationship question.12
On the other hand, pinpointing a convincing rationale for the primacy of
federal law poses difficulties. To be sure, Judge Rakoff advances rationales
well-grounded in federal law and important and familiar policy goals,
including the oft-cited goals of uniformity and promotion of disclosure in the
federal securities law system.13 Nonetheless—and precisely because of the
confounding state of insider trading laws—it is possible to take issue with
these rationales. First, these rationales sit uncomfortably with federal
precedent clearly disfavoring federal common law as well as federal courts’
clear reliance on state law when developing insider trading laws.14 Second,
these rationales center on policy goals associated with uniformity and
disclosure that are also awash in mixed signals.15 Third, these rationales fail
to appropriately account for the existing and preexisting role of state law in
policing insider trading claims.16
After highlighting the confounding nature of these rationales, this Article
offers the principle of certainty as a possible rationale that more effectively
justifies the federal preference while balancing the roles of state and federal
law. Importantly, this Article contends that the resolution of this source issue
is critical because of the centrality of the fiduciary relationship to insider
trading law. Pinpointing appropriate rationales for this resolution is also
critical. In other contexts, Supreme Court cases have focused on problematic
7. 904 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
8. See id. at 374.
9. See Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2014).
10. See, e.g., Mueller v. Thomas, 84 F. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Fortson
v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992); Abell v. Potomac
Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797
F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
11. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
12. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing state law uncertainty).
13. See generally John C. Coffee Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984).
14. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
15. See infra Parts III.B, III.C.
16. See infra Part II.B.
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reasoning to discard court rulings, including rulings based on well-settled and
long-held principles.17 These cases affirm this Article’s core assertion that
the reasoning we use matters.
Part I examines the primacy of fiduciary relationships to insider trading
liability and highlights the divergent opinions related to the source of that
relationship. Part II reveals the mixed messages undergirding our insider
trading laws to demonstrate why reliance on those laws poses challenges for
a convincing response to the source question. Part III evaluates policy goals
animating the source debate and, after demonstrating some of the difficulties
with those goals, focuses on the possibility of certainty as a guiding principle.
Part IV concludes by offering the principle of certainty as a possible rationale
that more effectively justifies the federal preference while balancing the roles
of state and federal law.
I. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS AND THE SOURCE SPLIT
A. Relationship Versus Duty
The concepts of fiduciary relationship and fiduciary duty are often used
interchangeably even though they focus on two distinct issues. The fiduciary
relationship relates to the characteristics of a relationship that qualifies as
“fiduciary” in nature.18 The Supreme Court has referred to this relationship
as one in which information is entrusted with an expectation that it be held
in confidence, distinguishing the fiduciary relationship from one involving
parties who are “complete stranger[s].”19 Fiduciary duty refers to the
obligations that arise from the fiduciary relationship.20 For purposes of
insider trading, people within a fiduciary relationship have a fiduciary duty
to either disclose confidential information to those within their fiduciary
relationship or abstain from trading on the information.21 In addition to this
“disclose or abstain” duty,22 the Court has recognized a fiduciary duty to
refrain from passing confidential information for a personal benefit.23
Although distinct, these two concepts are inextricably linked. This is
because to violate the insider trading laws, a person must violate the fiduciary
duty arising out of a fiduciary relationship.24 In Chiarella v. United States,25
the Supreme Court concluded that the trader did not have the necessary
17. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019) (overturning
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985), because of “exceptionally ill founded” reasoning); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S.
Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (overturning Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), based on the “quality
of the decision’s reasoning”).
18. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228, 232–33 (1980).
19. Id. at 232–33.
20. See id. at 231–32; SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc).
21. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–32; Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
22. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
23. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
24. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230; Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1199.
25. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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fiduciary relationship to expose him to insider trading liability.26 In Dirks v.
SEC,27 while a fiduciary relationship existed, the Court could not establish
that anyone had breached a fiduciary duty arising from the relationship.28
Thus, the issues of duty and relationship are distinct but related. This Article
focuses on the fiduciary relationship but recognizes that these concepts are
interwoven and often discussed as if they are the same.
B. Centrality of the Fiduciary Relationship
Whether someone trades or passes on confidential information, the
Supreme Court has made clear that insider trading liability exists only if that
someone breaches a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship.29 In
Chiarella, the Court, led by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., took its first
opportunity to address insider trading under Rule 10b-5 and link such
liability to a fiduciary relationship.30 The Court announced that insider
trading liability could only arise from an insider’s fiduciary relationship with
the company in whose stock the insider trades, known as the “classical” or
“traditional” theory of insider trading liability.31 In the Court’s view,
fiduciary relationships under the classical theory included insiders, such as
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders.32 Later courts, including the
Supreme Court, extended the classical theory to all corporate employees,
regardless of their positions,33 referring to such employees as “permanent
insiders.”34 Fiduciary relationships under the classical theory also include
“temporary” insiders such as attorneys, accountants, and consultants,
entrusted with confidential corporate information.35 Because the trader in
Chiarella was neither a permanent nor a temporary corporate insider, the
Court held that he did not have the necessary fiduciary relationship for insider
trading liability.36
In United States v. O’Hagan,37 the Supreme Court extended insider trading
liability beyond individuals in a relationship with the specific corporation
that is the subject of the stock trades but nevertheless tethered the extension
to fiduciary relationships.38 The “misappropriation theory” adopted in
O’Hagan premises liability on a “fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of
26. Id. at 232–33.
27. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
28. Id. at 662.
29. See id. at 646; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–32.
30. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
31. See id. at 228; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997); Nagy,
supra note 3, at 132.
32. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
33. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; see also Mark J. Loewenstein & William K. S. Wang,
The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 53–54 (2005).
34. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
35. Id. at 652; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
36. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231.
37. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
38. See Nagy, supra note 3, at 1339; see also Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of
Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 845, 864 (2013).
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those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.”39 While
some of the Justices were willing to impose liability on misappropriators
without a fiduciary relationship,40 the O’Hagan majority limited the theory
to those within a fiduciary relationship or a similar relationship of “trust and
confidence.”41
In focusing on fiduciary relationships, the O’Hagan majority significantly
raised the importance of that element in the insider trading inquiry. It is
notable that the relationship at the crux of O’Hagan was a prototypical
fiduciary relationship.42 James O’Hagan was a partner in a law firm
representing Grand Metropolitan PLC (“Grand Met”) in its potential tender
offer for the Pillsbury Company (“Pillsbury”).43 O’Hagan purchased
Pillsbury securities based on confidential information he learned through his
firm, resulting in a $4.3 million profit once the tender offer was announced.44
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought suit against
O’Hagan under Rule 10b-5.45 No one disputed that O’Hagan was clearly in
a fiduciary relationship with his law firm and Grand Met; the relationship
among a lawyer, the law firm, and the client is the kind of typical fiduciary
relationship in which confidential information is entrusted.46 However, that
fiduciary relationship was not with the company in whose stock O’Hagan
had traded (i.e., Pillsbury), as required by the classical theory of insider
trading.47 Thus, for the SEC to impose liability on O’Hagan, it would have
to advance a new theory. Expanding insider trading liability to include the
misappropriation theory allowed the Court to capture people like O’Hagan
who were in fiduciary relationships unconnected to the corporation in whose
stock they traded.48 More importantly, by shifting focus away from the
corporation that is the subject of the trade, the misappropriation theory
further elevated the importance of the fiduciary relationship.49
In Dirks, the Court again extended insider trading liability but to situations
in which confidential information is passed by someone, i.e., the “tipper,”
and then ultimately traded upon by someone else, the “tippee.”50 Although
the SEC and the other Justices urged the Court to find liability in the absence
of a fiduciary relationship, the majority—led by Justice Powell—refused.51
The Court proclaimed, “[w]e were explicit in Chiarella” that no insider
39. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
40. See id. at 680–701 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Nagy, supra note 3, at 1330.
41. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228).
42. Id. at 647.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 648.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 650–53 (adopting the misappropriation theory).
49. See id. at 652–53.
50. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
51. See id. at 655–59 (rejecting the SEC’s position); see also Kim, supra note 38, at 863;
Nagy, supra note 3, at 1327 (noting the Dirks majority used the word “fiduciary” thirty-three
times).
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trading liability could arise without a fiduciary relationship.52 Thus, even
though tippers merely pass information without trading, tippers must
nonetheless breach a fiduciary relationship in order to be held liable for
insider trading.53 Tying the tippee’s liability to a fiduciary relationship was
not as straightforward because, as the mere recipient of information, the
tippee is not a party to a fiduciary relationship.54 The Court resolved this
quandary by theorizing that the tippee assumes a fiduciary duty when the
tipper breaches her fiduciary relationship and the tippee knows or should
know about the breach.55 In the Court’s view, this made the tippee a
participant after the fact in the tipper’s breach of her fiduciary relationship.56
In this way, the Court managed to ‘“fiduciarize’ the tippee”57 and tether
tippee liability to a fiduciary relationship, albeit indirectly. The Court also
made clear that a fiduciary relationship is the lynchpin for establishing any
form of insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5.58
Some may dismiss the continued importance of the fiduciary relationship.
There is considerable evidence revealing that many courts have been willing
to ignore or loosen the fiduciary construct when deciding insider trading
cases.59 As Professor John Coffee suggests, this willingness is highlighted
by recent Second Circuit cases that appear to have not only relaxed the
importance of fiduciary duty in tipping cases60 but also eliminated the
necessity of proving fiduciary duty altogether.61 Given the high volume of
insider trading cases in the Second Circuit, its pronouncements on this
issue—and seeming movement away from fiduciary concepts—are
significant.
However, these movements in the Second Circuit do not signal a complete
abandonment of the fiduciary relationship construct. First, these cases focus
on tipping and thus may only be applicable to a subset of insider trading
cases.62 Second, these cases focus on fiduciary duty and thus do not directly
52. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
53. See id. at 654–55.
54. See id. at 655; Nagy, supra note 3, at 1328.
55. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
56. See id. at 658.
57. Nagy, supra note 3, at 1328.
58. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
59. See Nagy, supra note 3, at 1336–52.
60. See generally United States v. Martoma (Martoma II), 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018)
(relaxing the personal benefit rule); United States v. Martoma (Martoma I), 869 F.3d 58 (2d
Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018).
61. See United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 36 (2d Cir. 2019) (upholding liability for
passing confidential information under Title 18 that does not have a fiduciary duty element).
62. The Second Circuit cases, Martoma I and Martoma II, both involved allegations
related to tipping and held that, to be convicted of insider trading, the tipper did not need to
have a “meaningfully close relationship” with the tippee. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 73;
Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 69–70. Instead, the tipper could be held liable if the tipper had a
fiduciary relationship and breached her duty by passing information for a personal benefit,
which could include an intention to benefit the tippee—irrespective of the relationship
between the tipper and the tippee. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 75; Martoma I, 869 F.3d at
69–70. United States v. Blaszczak also involved tipping liability. In that case, the Second
Circuit held that the Dirks personal benefit test used for finding liability in the tipping context
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speak to the significance of the relationship inquiry.63 Third, and most
importantly, even as courts (including the Second Circuit) appear willing to
weaken the fiduciary duty constraint, courts have been very clear, in both
tipping and trading cases, that a fiduciary relationship remains an essential
element.64 Such cases therefore reveal that a fiduciary relationship continues
to play a pivotal role in the insider trading ecosystem.
C. The Federal Circuit Split
1. Understanding the Source Question
The source question refers to which law governs the issue of whether a
fiduciary relationship exists. In other words, should courts look to state law
or federal law when seeking to ascertain if a fiduciary relationship exists?
Given the necessity of a fiduciary relationship, if a court determines that no
such relationship exists, then no liability exists. Hence, which forum governs
the question can be outcome determinative and thus has significant
ramifications for assessing who is exposed to insider trading liability.
2. Whitman and Federal Common Law
In Whitman, Judge Rakoff held that federal common law governed the
source question.65 In that case, the defendant, a lower-level employee,
argued that state law determined the question of fiduciary relationship.66 The
defendant then argued that he was not in a fiduciary relationship for insider
trading purposes because the law of the relevant state, California, did not
consider low-level employees to be in a fiduciary relationship with their
corporations.67 Judge Rakoff concluded federal common law controlled the
question of what constituted a fiduciary relationship.68 Based on that
conclusion, Judge Rakoff easily found that the defendant could be subject to
insider trading liability because federal law not only characterizes all insiders
as participants in a fiduciary relationship but also imposes upon such
does not apply to the federal wire fraud and securities fraud statutes under Title 18. Blaszczak,
947 F.3d at 37.
63. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 37 (focusing on the need to establish a personal benefit
test, which is linked to the tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty); Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 64, 67–
68, 72–73 (focusing on the tipper’s breach of her fiduciary duty and finding that the necessary
breach centered on the purpose of the tip and that so long as the tipper’s purpose was to benefit
the tippee, a breach could be established); Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 63–64, 69–70 (focusing on
elements needed to demonstrate that a tipper had breached her duty and finding that a breach
did not require the existence of a meaningfully close relationship).
64. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 58–61, 63–64, 69–70 (noting that the tipper—Gilman—
had a relationship where he was entrusted with confidential information and expected to
refrain from disclosing such information); see also Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 64, 67–69, 72–73
(noting the same).
65. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555
F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
66. See id. at 368.
67. See id. at 369.
68. See id. at 374.
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participants a duty to “disclose or abstain” that the defendant clearly
violated.69
In Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc.,70 the Second Circuit agreed with the Whitman
holding.71 Steginsky involved corporate insiders who had traded in shares of
their corporation’s stock.72 The defendants argued that the law of the state
in which the corporation was formed, the Cayman Islands, governed the
question of whether they owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation.73 The law
of the Cayman Islands apparently did not recognize a fiduciary relationship
or otherwise impose a fiduciary duty on corporate insiders in this context.74
The defendants sought to rely on state law to refute the finding of a fiduciary
relationship, thereby avoiding insider trading liability.75 Citing Whitman, the
Second Circuit held that federal common law controlled the issue.76 In
reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit noted that it had not previously
made the source of the fiduciary principle explicit and hence was correcting
that oversight.77
At least two district courts in the Fifth Circuit have found that federal law
governs the resolution of issues under the federal securities laws.78 In 2017,
a judge in the Eastern District of Texas, citing both Whitman and Steginsky,
concluded that federal law governed the question of the existence of a
fiduciary relationship under the federal securities laws.79 This case involved
securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5, arising out of allegations of
misstatements and omissions by a promoter of a corporation’s stock, not
insider trading.80 However, the court focused on the fiduciary relationship
requirement under Rule 10b-5 and relied on Whitman when assessing the law
governing that requirement.81 The SEC argued that state law controlled the
question of whether the promoter owed a duty to purchasers of the stock.82
Importantly, while federal law did not recognize a fiduciary relationship in
this context, the SEC contended that state law did.83 The court noted that the
Fifth Circuit had not yet determined whether state or federal law applied to
determine the existence of a fiduciary relationship and that the federal circuits
were split on the issue.84 After analyzing that split, the court announced its

69. See id.
70. 741 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2014).
71. See id. at 371.
72. See id. at 367.
73. See id. at 371.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See generally SEC v. Mapp, 240 F. Supp. 3d 569 (E.D. Tex. 2017); SEC v. Cuban,
634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated by 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
79. See Mapp, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 583.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 582–83.
82. See id. at 582.
83. See id. at 582–83.
84. See id. at 582.
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agreement with Whitman and the Second Circuit.85 The court then concluded
that, because federal law did not recognize a fiduciary relationship, no insider
trading liability could attach to the promoter’s activities.86
Along these same lines, in SEC v. Cuban,87 a judge in the Northern District
of Texas held that federal law controlled the issue of fiduciary relationships
under Rule 10b-5.88 In that case, the SEC brought an insider trading action
against Mark Cuban based on the misappropriation theory.89 Cuban argued
that state law governed the question of whether he had a fiduciary
relationship for purposes of insider trading laws.90 While not discounting
state law, the court concluded that federal law was relevant to the issue
concerning the source of the fiduciary relationship on which insider trading
violations were predicated.91 The decision was vacated and remanded on
other grounds, so the Fifth Circuit never addressed the issue involving the
appropriate source of the fiduciary relationship underlying the insider trading
violation.92 However, it is noteworthy that on remand, the district court
addressed the issue of source solely with reference to federal law.93
3. Federal Court Reliance on State Law
Other federal courts interpreting § 10 and Rule 10b-5 have held that state
law governs the source issue.94 These cases do not involve insider trading
violations.95 Professors Donald C. Langevoort and Mitu Gulati have
cautioned against importing the dicta and holdings of insider trading cases
into noninsider cases, despite the fact that they rest on the same statute.96
Mindful of that caution, this Article nonetheless contends that these cases
have relevance to the fiduciary relationship inquiry. Indeed, their caution
focuses on courts’ attempts to apply the disclosure concepts embedded in
insider trading cases to other securities law contexts.97 The cases this section
highlights directly involve interpretation of fiduciary relationships in the
context of securities fraud claims under § 10 and Rule 10b-5.98 Importantly,
the cases often rely on insider trading cases such as Chiarella and Dirks for
85. See id. at 583.
86. See id.
87. 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated by 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
88. See id. at 721–22.
89. See id. at 717.
90. See id. at 721.
91. See id. at 721–22.
92. See generally Cuban, 620 F.3d 551.
93. See SEC v. Cuban, No. 08-cv-2050-D, 2013 WL 791405, at *8–10 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
5, 2013).
94. See generally Mueller v. Thomas, 84 F. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam);
Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992); Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes &
Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
95. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
96. See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under
Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1675 (2004).
97. See id. at 1646–73.
98. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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the proposition that liability for securities fraud must be premised on a
fiduciary relationship.99 Thus, these cases implicitly embrace the contention
that the principles related to the appropriate interpretation of a fiduciary
relationship under insider trading rules are the same as those related to
securities fraud claims more generally.100 As such, these cases serve as a
useful guide for understanding the nature of the disagreement concerning the
source of fiduciary relationships under Rule 10b-5.
The Fourth Circuit has been cited by litigants and other courts addressing
the source issue under insider trading laws for the proposition that state law
controls the source question. In Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest &
Minick,101 investors who purchased stock in a real estate venture brought a
securities fraud action under § 10(b) against a law firm representing the
venture, alleging that the law firm had breached its duty to disclose material
information related to their investment.102 Citing Chiarella, the Fourth
Circuit noted that liability related to an omission could only be established
based on a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship.103 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that “the federal securities laws are not the source” of the fiduciary
relationship.104 Instead, the Fourth Circuit insisted that the fiduciary
relationship “arises only where there is some basis outside [of] the securities
laws, such as state law, for finding a fiduciary or other confidential
relationship.”105 Because state law did not impose such a relationship in this
context, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the necessary fiduciary
relationship did not exist and hence the securities law claim could not be
maintained.106
In Mueller v. Thomas,107 the Fourth Circuit grappled with a claim
involving allegations of securities fraud based on material misstatements and
omissions within a stock purchase agreement.108 Citing Fortson, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that any duty to disclose had to arise from a fiduciary
relationship under state law.109 Because Virginia state law did not recognize
a fiduciary relationship between sophisticated commercial parties transacting
at arm’s length, no duty existed upon which a securities fraud action could
be premised.110 These and other Fourth Circuit precedents have been cited
by litigants and other courts when analyzing insider trading claims.111
99. See infra notes 101–23 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101. 961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992).
102. See id. at 472.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 475.
107. 84 F. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
108. See id. at 275 (finding that a contract between two sophisticated parties does not create
a fiduciary relationship under state law).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 722 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated by 620 F.3d
551 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Sw. Realty, Ltd. v. Daseke, No. CA3–89–3055–D, 1992 WL
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The Seventh Circuit also has held that state law controls the source issue
for purposes of federal securities laws.112 In Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt,113 purchasers of bonds and notes brought suit against a law
firm under Rule 10b-5, seeking to hold the law firm liable for misstatements
and omissions related to the purchase of those securities.114 The Seventh
Circuit cited Dirks and Chiarella for the proposition that the relevant duty to
disclose must be based on a fiduciary relationship.115 The court then
emphasized that this duty does not come from the federal securities laws but
“from a fiduciary relation[ship] outside securities law.”116 The court further
noted that if the duty stemmed from federal law, “the inquiry would be
circular.”117 While the case does not deal explicitly with insider trading, the
references to Dirks and Chiarella indicate the court’s belief that the laws of
insider trading parallel the laws of securities fraud, at least with respect to the
question of a fiduciary relationship.
The Fifth Circuit has similarly been cited for the proposition that state law
governs this source issue. In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,118 bond
purchasers brought a § 10(b) action against the developers whose companies
issued the bonds.119 In seeking to analyze whether the developers could be
held liable, the inquiry focused on whether they had a duty arising out of a
fiduciary relationship between the purchaser and the developers.120 The Fifth
Circuit asserted that this analysis must focus on state law.121 The court
proclaimed that for purposes of resolving the question of source, it “join[ed]
the Seventh Circuit.”122 The court then cited Barker for the proposition that
liability must stem from an existing duty, not one created by or arising out of
the federal securities laws.123 Given its citation to Barker, the court
apparently agreed with the reasoning that otherwise the inquiry would be
circular.
D. The Debate State Side
Some state court judges and litigants have connected the source debate at
the federal level to the analysis of fiduciary relationships at the state level
because there are some breach of fiduciary duty claims under state law based

373166, at *10 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 1992)); see also SEC v. Mapp, 240 F. Supp. 3d 569, 583
(E.D. Tex. 2017) (citing Mueller, 84 F. App’x at 275).
112. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986).
113. 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
114. See id. at 495.
115. See id. at 495–96.
116. See id. at 496.
117. See id.
118. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988).
119. See id. at 1126.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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on insider trading violations.124 Those claims not only concern analysis of
fiduciary relationships but also essentially piggyback off of relationships and
duties germane to Rule 10b-5.125 Thus, these state law claims implicate the
same fiduciary relationship implicated by federal law.126
In Delaware, the heart of this debate is the continued viability of claims
arising from the 1949 case of Brophy v. Cities Service Co.127 (so-called
Brophy claims). A Brophy claim is an action for breach of fiduciary duty
arising out of an insider trading violation.128 Brophy centered on Thomas
Kennedy, an executive secretary to one of a company’s directors.129
Kennedy was privy to confidential company information, including
information about the company’s intention to purchase its own shares.130
Based on that information, Kennedy purchased a large block of his
company’s shares and then resold them at a profit once the company
repurchased shares.131 A core issue in Brophy was whether a “mere
employee” could be held liable for breach of a duty related to insider trading
activities.132 The court held that Kennedy could be held liable so long as he
occupied a position of trust and confidence analogous to a fiduciary.133 That
is, so long as he breached a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship.134
After concluding that Kennedy’s position was fiduciary in nature because he
was entrusted with access to confidential information, the court found that
Kennedy could be held liable for breaching his fiduciary duty based on his
insider trading activities.135
Thereafter, Brophy, later affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court,136 set
the standard for fiduciary duty claims in Delaware arising out of insider
trading violations.137 Since 1949, Delaware courts have repeatedly relied on
Brophy to prosecute breach of fiduciary duty claims involving insider
trading.
In 2010, the source question collided with Brophy claims, triggering a
debate about the continued validity of those claims. Based on the contention
that federal law controlled the source question, some Delaware judges and
124. See generally Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011);
Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683 (Del. Ch. 2010).
125. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
127. 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
128. See id. at 7–8.
129. See id. at 7.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 7–8.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 838 (Del. 2011); In re Oracle
Corp., Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904, 904 (Del. Ch. 2004).
137. See Douglas M. Branson, Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule—Insider Trading
Under State Law, 45 ALA. L. REV. 753, 770 (1994); Donald C. Langevoort, Federalism in
Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections on Delaware, California, and State Regulation of
Insider Trading, 40 U. S.F. L. REV. 879, 886 (2006).
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litigants began to question whether Brophy claims should be considered good
law.138 These judges and litigants suggested that the controlling nature of
federal law “arguably preempted” state law claims in this area.139 These
parties further contended that because federal law controlled the source
question, federal law demanded uniformity that crowded out state law.140
In Pfeiffer v. Toll,141 the Delaware Court of Chancery mounted a strenuous
defense of Brophy claims rooted at least in part in the notion that state law
controls the source debate.142 Responding to the contention that Brophy
claims were outdated and no longer relevant, the court insisted that state law
fiduciary duty claims were relevant because the federal insider trading
regime depended on state law.143 “Federal law does not give rise to or
establish the fiduciary duties of directors or officers. Those matters are
governed by state law. Thus the federal insider trading regime as currently
structured rests on a foundation of state law fiduciary duties.”144 The court
further argued that state law served as the “cornerstone” of the federal insider
trading regime.145 The court then cited numerous insider trading cases,
including Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Dirks, not only to illuminate the insider
trading system’s “dependence on [] underlying fiduciary relationships”146
but also to support the contention that the Supreme Court had endorsed the
notion that state law was the source of those underlying fiduciary
relationships.147 The Pfeiffer court concluded by arguing that the notion of
federal law as the dictator of the source question would be inconsistent with
how the law had developed and the vital role breach of fiduciary duty claims
played in that development.148 Hence, the Pfeiffer court upheld the viability
of Brophy claims by rejecting the notion that federal law controlled the
source debate.149 However, mindful of uniformity concerns, the Pfeiffer
court limited the potential damages associated with a Brophy claim to those
not duplicative of federal law.150
The Delaware Supreme Court did not reject the Pfeiffer court’s analysis
regarding state law as the genesis of fiduciary relationships for purposes of
federal insider trading laws.151 In Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co.,152
the Delaware Supreme Court sought to put concerns about the viability of

138. See Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 698 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing statements from
Chancellor Chandler); see also Kahn, 23 A.3d at 838.
139. See Pfeiffer, 989 A.2d at 698.
140. See id. at 704.
141. 989 A.2d 683 (Del. Ch. 2010).
142. See id. at 683.
143. See id. at 704.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 704–06.
148. See id. at 706.
149. See id. at 707–08.
150. See id. at 698–99.
151. See generally Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011).
152. 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011).
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Brophy to bed and upheld its broad application and holding.153 The court
invalidated the portion of the Pfeiffer opinion that sought to narrow Brophy’s
reach.154 In doing so, the court clearly rejected the notion that state law could
not play a role in policing insider trading violations and defining the fiduciary
parameters related to those duties.155 However, the court did not directly
address the Pfeiffer court’s analysis of the source issue, thereby leaving open
the issue of source and how it impacts the state fiduciary claim.
II. DEBATING THE DEBATE
In concluding that federal law controls the source issue, Judge Rakoff
relies heavily on the foundational federal cases.156 However, those who
disagree rely on those same foundational cases.157 As this part highlights,
this fact underscores the mixed signals that may be broadcast by relying on
those cases.
A. The Reality and Fiction of Federal Common Law
Both Judge Rakoff and the Second Circuit note that the Supreme Court’s
insider trading cases have implicitly assumed the fiduciary relationship
question to be a matter of federal common law.158 Importantly, after his
comprehensive review of Justice Powell’s notes and the history of Chiarella,
Professor A. C. Pritchard concluded that in formulating the fiduciary
relationship under Chiarella, Justice Powell “creat[ed] a federal fiduciary
principle” akin to federal common law.159 Justice Powell wrote the majority
opinions in both Chiarella and Dirks and, according to Pritchard, had become
the Court’s “securities law leader.”160 Pritchard’s conclusion therefore
reflects compelling evidence that federal common law represents the source
of the fiduciary relationship.161

153. See id. at 837.
154. See id. at 840.
155. See id.
156. Judge Rakoff also focuses on Rule 10b5-2. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F.
Supp. 2d 363, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014). Rule 10b5-2 does
not focus on traditional fiduciary relationships or address relationships outside of the
misappropriation theory. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2019). Thus, Rule 10b5-2 may not
significantly advance the federal law case.
157. See Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 704 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also SEC v. Cochran, 214
F.3d 1261, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 2000); Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961
F.2d 469, 472 (4th Cir. 1992); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,
495 (7th Cir. 1986); Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1207 (noting insider trading cases that
reference state law).
158. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 369; see also Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365,
371 (2d Cir. 2014) (pinpointing the Supreme Court’s assumption that relevant fiduciary duty
“springs from federal law”).
159. See A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 933 (2003).
160. See id. at 846.
161. See id.
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However, numerous courts and commentators have noted that such a
conclusion appears inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.162 Pritchard
concedes this inconsistency, noting that Chiarella “sits in considerable
tension” with the “rejection of a federal fiduciary standard in Santa Fe.”163
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green164 arose out of a Second Circuit holding
that a short-form merger that ran afoul of state corporate law also violated
Rule 10b-5.165 The Second Circuit concluded that federal common law,
rather than state law, governed the existence of a fiduciary breach triggering
federal liability.166 Overruling the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court
asserted that courts should be reluctant to “federalize” portions of state
corporate law dealing with securities transactions.167 Commentators contend
that the message from Santa Fe was that federal courts were not to create
federal common law in the area involving state fiduciary duties.168 Thus, the
creation of federal law in Chiarella seems contrary to Santa Fe.
This contradiction is especially notable in light of Justice Powell’s
sentiments regarding the Second Circuit’s holding in Santa Fe. As Pritchard
notes, Powell found the holding “startling enough” that he “dictated a ninepage memorandum summarizing it” and referred to the opinion as “obviously
wrong.”169 Indeed, Justice Powell expressed a belief that § 10(b) was not
intended “to create a federal common law.”170 These sentiments reveal that
Powell’s creation of a federal common law in Chiarella was in tension with
Santa Fe and Powell’s own views regarding the impropriety of federal
common law. More importantly, they highlight the mixed messages, and
thus the considerable tension, associated with using Chiarella as support for
the propriety of federal common law as a guiding principle.
Relying on Chiarella for the proposition that federal law controls is
especially problematic when one considers the clear fact that Justice Powell
essentially ignored at least two sources of federal law in order to reach the
holding in Chiarella. First, Chiarella ignored or sidestepped Santa Fe.
Second, it ignored federal law embodied in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,171 when it rejected the Second Circuit’s equal access theory in favor of
a fiduciary principle.172 The one and only time the Supreme Court cited
162. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1201; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading
Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52
SMU L. REV. 1589, 1589 (1999); Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 96, at 1655.
163. See Pritchard, supra note 159, at 933.
164. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
165. See id. at 465–77.
166. See id. at 470.
167. See id. at 479.
168. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 96, at 1655.
169. See Pritchard, supra note 159, at 871.
170. See id. at 872. These sentiments are consistent with Pritchard’s overarching
assessment that Powell sought to narrow the scope of the federal securities laws and to check
the growth of federal law encroachment into state corporate law. See id. at 846, 860.
171. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
172. Bainbridge, supra note 162, at 1599; Lisa M. Fairfax, From Equality to Duty: On
Altering the Reach, Impact, and Meaning of the Texas Gulf Legacy, 71 SMU L. REV. 729, 736
(2018).
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Texas Gulf Sulphur was to note that other courts had validated insider trading
related to undisclosed information.173 This cursory reference, despite the fact
that Texas Gulf Sulphur was viewed as the leading authority on insider
trading law at the time,174 reveals that Chiarella essentially refused to even
acknowledge the only existing federal law on this issue. Using Chiarella as
support for the primacy of federal law when the Court appeared to give short
shrift to federal law seems problematic.
This analysis begs an important question: why did Justice Powell ignore
his deep concern for state law and create federal common law? Pritchard’s
extensive research reveals that Justice Powell was simply determined to
reject the equal access theory articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur.175 Powell’s
determination was so significant that he was willing to sidestep the dictates
of Santa Fe and his strong concerns about the importance of state law.176
Justice Powell also ignored several state laws in his rush to focus on those
aspects of state law rooted in fiduciary relationships,177 a point Justices Harry
Blackmun and Thurgood Marshall make in their dissent to Chiarella.178
Indeed, the admittedly state law principle Powell adopted was not even a
majority principle. At the time of the decision, most states did not recognize
a duty that extended from directors and officers to shareholders, and even
those jurisdictions that did recognize such a duty did not extend it to cover
lower-level employees or temporary insiders in the manner that Chiarella
announced.179 Chiarella’s cherry-picking of state laws can only be
understood in the context of Powell’s strong desire to craft a principle that
would overturn Texas Gulf Sulphur.180 It is important to remember that when
the Justices sought to establish the contours of an insider trading violation,
unless they looked to state law, they were essentially writing on a blank slate.
This is because the bulk of insider trading prohibitions does not arise from
any specific statute; it therefore has to be a creature of judge-made law.181
What does this mean for purposes of this Article’s thesis? It simply further
illuminates the mixed messages that pervade insider trading laws. First, it
underscores the unsatisfactory nature of relying on federal common law
when the creator of federal common law had his own concerns about its
propriety.182 Second, it highlights the problematic nature of relying on
173. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980); see also Fairfax, supra note
172, at 736.
174. See Fairfax, supra note 172, at 736.
175. See Pritchard, supra note 159, at 931–33.
176. See id.
177. See Nagy, supra note 3, at 1326–27.
178. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Fairfax, supra note
172, at 744–45.
179. See Nagy, supra note 3, at 1337.
180. See id. at 1340–41.
181. See id. at 1322.
182. See Pritchard, supra note 159, at 871–72 (referencing Powell’s assertion that he did
not believe § 10 was intended to create a federal common law); see also supra note 170 and
accompanying text (noting that Pritchard’s research revealed Powell’s desire to protect state
law and check the growth of federal law).
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Chiarella as theoretical support for the propriety of federal common law
when the theory was simply a means to an end, and Chiarella overlooked
sources of federal law to get to that end.183 Third, it reveals that the Justices
at the time (including the author of Chiarella) had significant concerns that
a federal common law would undermine the need to protect the role of state
law.184 Justice Powell was simply willing to subordinate those concerns to
achieve a particular outcome. Taken together, this analysis highlights the
challenges posed by reliance on federal common law as advanced under
Chiarella.
B. The Role and Relevance of State Common Law
The conclusion that federal law should be given primacy in relation to the
source question also sits uncomfortably with the Supreme Court’s clear
reliance on state law.
Chiarella clearly relied on state law. Chiarella noted that the concept that
fiduciary relationships give rise to insider trading violations was not a novel
twist.185 What was the only case law that Chiarella cited for this concept?
Brophy.186 In this regard, the Chiarella court borrowed from state law to
create the very foundation of the fiduciary relationship principle that governs
all insider trading cases.187 Confirming this borrowing, commentators have
noted that Chiarella appears to be based on a concept akin to the state law
fiduciary duty of loyalty.188
Similarly, in Dirks, the Supreme Court both acknowledged and relied upon
state law. The Dirks court recognized that fiduciary relationships on which
insider trading breaches were premised arose from state law, noting that
insiders have independent fiduciary duties that form the basis of the fiduciary
relationship required for insider trading purposes.189 The Dirks court clearly
affirmed that one way to establish a fiduciary relationship was through the
preexisting fiduciary one rooted in state law.190 Dirks also premised its
analysis related to violations of fiduciary duty by the tippee on concepts of
agency law rooted in state law.191 Indeed, both the concept that a tipper
violation occurs as a result of improperly communicating a fiduciary’s
information and the concept that a violation occurs when a tippee receives
confidential information that the tippee knows arises from improper
communication, stem from state law concepts of agency and unjust
enrichment.192 Pritchard observes that Justice Powell used Dirks to ensure
183. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 96, at 1676.
184. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
185. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
186. See id. at 228 n.10 (citing Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949)).
187. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1208–09.
188. See id. at 1200–01; Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 96, at 1655 (noting that Chiarella
focuses on state fiduciary duty).
189. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656 (1983).
190. See id. at 665.
191. See id. at 660.
192. See id. at 660 n.20.
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that “the federal common law of insider trading was brought into line with
the traditional distinction in state corporate law between breaches of care and
loyalty.”193
A similar pattern emerges with respect to O’Hagan. O’Hagan referenced
state law concepts of agency law when articulating its broadening of the
fiduciary relationship to include relationships of trust and confidence.194
Langevoort and Gulati contend that O’Hagan incorporated state law
fiduciary concepts in such an extensive manner that it made those laws play
a “front and center” role in the insider trading landscape.195
It is undeniable that each of the three foundational insider trading cases
heavily relies on state law. This clear reliance on state law in the origins of
the insider trading prohibition muddies the waters, making it difficult to rely
on these cases to provide clarity on the source question. Even Judge Rakoff
notes that general state law principles are helpful guides for determining the
parameters of the applicable federal common law.196 This heavy reliance
undercuts the notion that federal courts do not and should not look to state
law. It also begs an important question: if federal courts have historically
looked to state law to understand the parameters of the fiduciary relationship,
why can they no longer do so?
C. The Conundrum of State Fiduciary Law
The embrace of federal law in this area also sits in tension with the fact
that insider trading laws appear to condone, if not approve, state law claims
that arise from insider trading violations like Brophy. How do we align the
conclusion that federal law controls with these state law claims?
First, there are important policy reasons why state law should continue to
engage fiduciary duty claims based on insider trading. For example,
Delaware courts have emphasized the state’s strong public policy interest in
policing loyalty violations, including those related to protecting the
corporation’s interest in its confidential information and preventing the
misuse of that information.197 Justice Leo E. Strine Jr. insisted that utilizing
state fiduciary law to tackle insider trading serves the critical state interest of
policing violations of the duty of loyalty.198 Other Delaware opinions
similarly pinpoint states’ interest in preventing insiders from exploiting
material private information to make trading profits199 or otherwise abusing
their positions of trust and confidence.200
State law is also valuable because it allows for recoveries distinct from
those associated with insider trading prohibitions. This includes “costs and
193. See Pritchard, supra note 159, at 942; see also Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1208.
194. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
195. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 96, at 1655–56.
196. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555
F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
197. See Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 707 (Del. Ch. 2010).
198. See In re Oracle Corp., Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904, 929 (Del. Ch. 2004).
199. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505 & n.28 (Del. Ch. 2003).
200. See Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 840 (Del. 2011).
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expenses for regulatory proceedings and internal investigations, fees paid to
counsel and other professionals, fines paid to regulators, and judgments in
litigation.”201 This also includes any costs incurred by the corporation as a
result of the loyalty breach, such as investigation and litigation expenses
associated with defending against a stockholder suit.202
Both federal courts and commentators have acknowledged the important
role of state law, and federal courts have consistently recognized the validity
of those state law claims. In singling out Brophy, the Chiarella court can be
viewed as approving the fiduciary duty claims at the heart of Brophy.203
Other courts interpreting federal securities laws related to insider trading
have noted and assumed the existence of state law claims for a breach of
fiduciary duty.204 In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court made specific reference
to the fact that the misappropriator may have a breach of fiduciary duty claim
under state law.205 Moreover, even as the Second Circuit adopted Whitman,
it recognized the potential breach of fiduciary duty claims under state law.206
Acknowledging the importance of state law in this arena has implications
for those seeking to settle the source debate in favor of federal law. If, as the
Pfeiffer court suggests, the viability of a Brophy claim is dependent on the
recognition that state law governs the source question, how do we reconcile
that suggestion with the conclusion that federal law controls? Even if that
suggestion is invalid, there remains the problem that the notion that federal
law controls the fiduciary relationship question may be causing some courts
to question the viability of these state claims or otherwise to curtail their
efforts related to fiduciary duty breaches in the realm of insider trading. Here
again, we may be sending mixed signals if we are not clear about why federal
law controls and how that control should be reconciled with state law in this
area.
III. IN SEARCH OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES
A. Why It Matters
This Article asserts that federal law should control the source question.
This Article also asserts that rationales matter. The clarity of our rationales
impacts how other courts assess any conclusions we make, including their
willingness to accept those conclusions. Several Supreme Court cases have
essentially ruled that if decisions are based on convoluted, problematic, or
“ill founded” reasoning, then the Court need not uphold those decisions.207
201. See Pfeiffer, 989 A.2d at 700; Thorpe ex rel. Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d
436, 445 (Del. 1996). The Pfeiffer court discussed payments to resolve lawsuits, legal fees,
civil penalties, disgorged profits, and recovery of compensation forfeited by employees. See
Pfeiffer, 989 A.2d at 700.
202. See In re Primedia, Inc. S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 455, 472 (Del. Ch. 2013).
203. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.10 (1980).
204. See Pfeiffer, 989 A.2d at 704.
205. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997); Pfeiffer, 989 A.2d at 706.
206. Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 2014).
207. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Importantly, the Supreme Court has used this notion of problematic
reasoning to ignore long-held and well-settled doctrines.208 Hence, the Court
has made clear that the reasoning on which we base conclusions matters. Part
II revealed that rationales based on case law are murky; this next section
sheds light on the murkiness of some of the policy rationales heretofore
advanced.
B. The Illusiveness of Uniformity
At first glance, uniformity seems like an alluring guiding principle. As
Judge Rakoff notes, the history of insider trading suggests that the
requirements associated with those rules were not designed to vary from state
to state.209 Thus, the “idiosyncratic differences between the laws of various
states cannot be allowed to trump the federal interest in combating insider
trading.”210 The Second Circuit agreed that focusing on state law would
thwart the goal of promoting national uniformity in the securities market.211
Similarly, the SEC contended that focusing on state specific standards would
serve to “balkanize” the insider trading laws, leading to “divergent outcomes
under the federal securities laws depending on the state of jurisdiction in a
particular insider trading case.”212 Indeed, based on the cases cited in this
Article, the fiduciary relationship question could turn on the laws of
California, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, or the Cayman
Islands. Importantly, these laws are outcome determinative. For example,
in Whitman, the relevant California state law limited fiduciary relationships
to upper-level employees, while New York extended the duty to all
employees.213 Given that the existence of the fiduciary duty is necessary to
establish insider trading liability, if state law determines the duty question,
then that law is outcome determinative to the insider trading liability
question. Because those laws differ, those outcomes can be different.
Pritchard notes that even Justice Byron White, who authored Santa Fe and
“went out of his way” to defend state corporate law, insisted that state law
would need to give way to “ensure uniformity within the federal system.”214
Thus, the concept of uniformity seems to align nicely with the goals and
history of the federal securities laws.
However, the uniformity rationale seems to provide another set of mixed
messages. First, it is arguable that you can achieve uniformity by adopting a
“uniform rule” that federal courts should look to state courts to determine the
content of fiduciary relationships. A uniform rule that allows reliance on
208. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
209. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555
F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
210. Id. at 370.
211. See Steginsky, 741 F.3d at 371.
212. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 721–22 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated by 620 F.3d
551 (5th Cir. 2010).
213. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
214. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); Pritchard, supra note
159, at 871–72.
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state law aligns with the goal of allowing state laws to define the parameters
of their preexisting state law relationships while having “uniformity” in the
system. This means that uniformity may not require an embrace of federal
law. Second, if the uniformity rationale is intended to ensure uniform impact
or results, the rationale is inconsistent with insider trading laws because the
fiduciary relationship concept guarantees that those laws will not have
uniform impacts. Instead, only those with a fiduciary relationship will be
liable for insider trading, even if people trade on the same confidential
information. How does that promote the goal of uniform impact or results?
And if the fiduciary relationship principle sacrifices uniformity, then how can
uniformity be an appropriate goal on which we rely to dictate federal law’s
propriety? Finally, the concern for uniformity creates tension for state law
concerns. Clearly the notion that we need a unified system was a primary
motivator of the concerns around the legitimacy of state law fiduciary
claims.215 The claim for uniformity has no good answer for why these two
regimes can and must be able to operate together.
C. The Trouble with Disclosure
At first glance it makes sense for disclosure to serve as a policy goal when
resolving critical insider trading questions. The Supreme Court has
specifically acknowledged that the purpose of Rule 10b-5 was to implement
the philosophy of full disclosure.216 The federal securities law purpose of
providing a uniform system of disclosure would be undermined if state law,
with its many different vagaries, controlled the source issue.217 As Judge
Rakoff notes, where the issue is a duty to disclose, federal law must be
paramount to ensure transparency in the markets.218
Unmasked, however, disclosure becomes a very problematic guiding
principle. This is because the fiduciary relationship principle narrows rather
than expands disclosure, creating challenges with reliance on disclosure to
support that principle. It is clear that the general federal securities regime
focuses on disclosure. It is less clear that the insider trading rules are firmly
premised on disclosure, at least not disclosure for all market participants.
Instead, the fiduciary relationship principle only evidences concern about
disclosure as it relates to those within a fiduciary relationship. Those outside
of the fiduciary relationship have no disclosure obligation. In the context of
the misappropriation theory, concern for disclosure is actually further
devalued because disclosure is not even required to be made to the general
public but only to the source of confidential information. This analysis
demonstrates that insider trading rules in general, and the fiduciary
relationship principle in particular, are not necessarily overly concerned
about disclosure. As Langevoort and Gulati note, disclosure may just be a
215. See Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 698–99 (Del. Ch. 2010) (seeking to reconcile
Brophy claims with the potential for duplication of federal law recoveries).
216. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478.
217. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
218. See id. at 370.
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tool being used to facilitate policing self-dealing transactions.219 This
undermines the promise of disclosure as a guiding principle.
Further, disclosure does not capture all of the goals associated with insider
trading. Disclosure as a goal works best when viewed in the context of
traders because they can only trade with full disclosure. Indeed, the tipper
does not have a duty to disclose information.220 Moreover, disclosure does
not absolve the tipper of responsibility or liability.221 Instead, the only thing
that absolves the tipper is either abstaining from passing information or
passing it for an appropriate purpose.222 This analysis only buttresses the
view that disclosure in the context of insider trading is just a tool used to
ensure that a breach of duty does not arise.223 Disclosure thus appears to be
riddled with as many inconsistencies as the other rationales considered in this
Article.
D. Certainty
In revisiting and further considering why Whitman resonated, two
principles emerge. First, perhaps it is too much to ask that some broad
principle can be used to answer all of the problems that arise in the insider
trading ecosystem. Second, perhaps, at least in this context, the real concern
is certainty.
1. The Viability of Certainty
What does certainty have to offer? At its core, certainty facilitates reliance,
including reliance on judicial decisions.224 Certainty promotes confidence in
outcomes and decisions, credibility, and predictability and it signals fairness,
all of which encourage reliance on judicial decisions.225 In other words,
certainty ensures that people are not made to feel like the ground is “shifting
beneath their feet.”226 Empirical evidence reveals that when the level of
certainty in a court opinion increases, lower courts are more likely to
positively treat the decision.227 As a result, “certainty stands for something
that can help tip the scales in a case.”228
Certainty is closely linked to the principle of stare decisis. Stare decisis
has been defended on grounds of certainty, i.e., the importance of making
sure that the law will not change erratically and thus that society can presume
219. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 96, at 1676.
220. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
221. See id. at 659–67.
222. See id.
223. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1200; Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 96, at 1675–
76.
224. See Pamela C. Corley & Justin Wedeking, The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The
Importance of Certainty in Language, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 35, 35 (2014).
225. See id. at 39; see also Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative
Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1131 (2019).
226. See Kozel, supra note 225, at 1133.
227. See Corley & Wedeking, supra note 224, at 35.
228. See id. at 55.
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that there are bedrock principles that will not be overturned lightly.229 Thus,
stare decisis promotes the predictable and coherent development of legal
standards.230 In other words, it promotes certainty.
Even Bainbridge has acknowledged the importance of certainty in this
area. While he believes in the propriety of state law as the source of the
fiduciary question, Bainbridge essentially concedes that certainty may
require the acceptance of preferring federal law.231 As he noted, “we have
gone too far down the federal path to turn back.”232 Bainbridge also indicated
that certainty has created expectations and interests that essentially solidify
the case for preserving the status quo.233
2. Certainty and Coverage
Certainty supports the preference for federal law over state law. Federal
insider trading laws are certain with respect to who is covered by the fiduciary
relationship. It is true that the concept of the fiduciary relationship had its
genesis in a hodgepodge of state law. Nevertheless, federal law has evolved
into a relatively certain state. As a consequence, there is really no uncertainty
with respect to who federal law covers in the traditional fiduciary
relationship. Importantly, unlike other areas of insider trading law where
federal courts struggle for clarity, there is very little dispute about how
federal courts define a fiduciary relationship for purposes of the classical
theory. In this regard, federal law on the coverage issue is relatively stable
and certain.
By very sharp contrast, state law would introduce a level of uncertainty
that would be unacceptable in at least two respects. First, which state governs
this issue? The possibilities are numerous. One is the law of the state in
which the trading activity occurred. Of course, if trading activities occur in
multiple states, then uncertainty would arise based on how best to choose
among those states. A second possibility is the law of the state where the
corporation is doing business. A third possibility is the law of the state where
the employees or those engaging in the trading activity are located. In
Whitman, the defendant combined these second and third possibilities, urging
the court to focus on the law of the state where the tippers and their employers
were located.234 This may not be the same place. What if the employees
worked or were located in a state different from where the corporation was
located?
A fourth possibility is the law of the state of incorporation. Several
scholars have noted that the internal affairs doctrine dictates that any question

229. See Kozel, supra note 225, at 1131.
230. See id.
231. See Bainbridge, supra note 162, at 1650.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d 555
F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
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of fiduciary duty gets determined by the state of incorporation.235 Of course,
even this could implicate multiple states. In Whitman, the confidential
information at issue stemmed from three different companies:236 two
companies incorporated in Delaware and one company incorporated in
Bermuda.237
A second area of uncertainty is which state law governs this issue.
Potential contenders range from state laws on agency to unjust enrichment.
The government in Whitman focused on the state’s agency law. Other courts
focus on fiduciary duty law.238 Still others have focused on state property
law.239 Some courts have focused on the state law related to fiduciary
relationships more broadly.240 Some focus on the laws of unjust
enrichment.241 In Whitman, Judge Rakoff noted the many potential state law
avenues.242 One can imagine that the specter of uncertainty raised by these
varying avenues played a role in how he resolved the issue.
This analysis reveals that certainty provides a clear answer to the source
question: federal law.
3. Certainty and State Fiduciary Claims
Certainty also may serve as a useful guide in navigating the issues
surrounding the proper balance between state and federal law. Both
explicitly and implicitly, federal courts have always acknowledged the
important role states play in policing problematic behaviors of fiduciaries
based on insider trading activity.243 State claims predated the articulation of
insider trading rules.244 They also were at the heart of the type of claims that
the Supreme Court made efforts to protect when crafting its jurisprudence
related to securities fraud actions.245 And they, of course, formed the basis
of the fiduciary principles on which the insider trading laws rest. Given their
historical presence on the corporate and securities law landscape, it could
produce significant levels of uncertainty to proclaim that state law does not
have a continued role in policing these claims.

235. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1267.
236. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
237. See id. at 386 n.3.
238. See Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 838 (Del. 2011) (citing
cases); Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 696 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing cases and noting a state
law duty of loyalty); In re Force Prot., Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 08-1907, 2012 WL
12985420, at *15 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2012) (remarking the same).
239. See Bainbridge, supra note 162, at 1644–45.
240. See Mueller v. Thomas, 84 F. App’x 273, 275 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. Mapp, 240 F. Supp. 3d 569, 583 (E.D.
Tex. 2017).
241. See Kahn, 23 A.2d at 837–38; Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. Ch.
1949).
242. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
243. See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text.
244. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
245. See supra Part II.
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Relying on certainty also may provide greater comfort to state law
advocates around the issue of preemption. The goals of uniformity and
mandated disclosure may be viewed as in tension with the state system,
which explains why some in the state system suggest that those goals require
a focus on federal law coupled with a rejection of state law. However, dual
systems do not raise certainty issues. At the federal level, as a result of the
certainty related to coverage, federal courts no longer depend upon state
courts to resolve the issue of a fiduciary relationship. This means that the
two systems need not merge or otherwise intertwine around this issue.
Moreover, because the rationale for the federal preference is not tied to some
form of uniform result or disclosure regime, state regimes can police state
law violations in other or different ways so long as it does not negate the
needed certainty associated with ensuring that federal law determines the
coverage question. To be sure, at the state level, at least with respect to
coverage, it appears that state law actually draws upon federal law for
purposes of pinpointing coverage related to insider trading claims linked to
state fiduciary duty breaches. Indeed, it has not been the case that these state
fiduciary claims emerge based on relationships outside the parameters
established by federal law. Instead, they merely draw on the fiduciary
relationships already established under federal law. This not only
demonstrates that the two systems can coexist but also suggests that there
could be considerable uncertainty if federal law does not take the lead in
pinpointing coverage. While this does not undermine the state’s ability to
extend or limit coverage in the context of its own state law claims, it does
suggest that it would produce more (rather than less) uncertainty if the federal
regime’s coverage role were supplanted entirely by state law.
D. Is Policy Good Policy?
At the 2020 Institute for Law and Economic Policy (ILEP) conference,
Judge Gerard E. Lynch raised concerns about relying primarily, if not
exclusively, on policy rationales to support court decisions. Judge Lynch
noted that such reliance increases the possibility that judges will make
decisions based on their own personal preferences rather than ensuring that
decisions are tethered to a specific legal standard. Professor Jill Fisch noted
that the underlying policy goals of the insider trading laws may be as
convoluted as the case law itself. This is because the Justices disagreed about
the appropriate policy goals of insider trading. Other commentators have
similarly noted that there are multiple policy goals animating insider trading
laws, and some of those policy goals are in conflict with one another. Thus,
relying on policy goals could be as problematic and confusing as relying on
the insider trading doctrine itself.
While these sentiments certainly have merit, focusing on policy, at least in
this limited context, is valid for several reasons. First, as a general matter,
focusing on policy is even more critical when the law itself is ad hoc and
messy. Second, focusing on policy is valuable when that focus can provide
greater clarity. While other policy goals may prove more vexing, the policy
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goal associated with certainty provides clarity. Indeed, this policy goal is
one that is straightforward and avoids some of the boggy ground that is
associated not only with other policy rationales but also with the foundational
insider trading cases. Third, focusing on this policy may have merit because
certainty is a policy around which we likely can get some agreement. Courts
and commentators have suggested that this policy goal is actually important
for all judicial doctrines. Finally, so long as we are mindful that this policy
goal may not be appropriate for all purposes, it may prove valuable. Most of
the ILEP panelists agreed that it is ill-advised to refrain from seeking to use
a comprehensive principle to answer all of the vexing problems associated
with the insider trading laws. To that end, while policy could prove
challenging as an answer to other issues, it may be that this policy works to
resolve this issue.
CONCLUSION
The law of insider trading makes it abundantly clear that demonstrating
liability requires the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Yet there is less
clarity on whether state or federal law governs the question about what types
of relationships are included in the definition of a fiduciary relationship. The
centrality of the fiduciary relationship to all forms of insider trading
violations under Rule 10b-5 makes the lack of clarity on this issue especially
concerning.
In Whitman, Judge Rakoff waded into the debate regarding the appropriate
source, holding that federal law controls the inquiry regarding what
constitutes a fiduciary relationship.246 On the other side of that debate are
those insisting that state law should control this inquiry.
This Article firmly agrees with the central holding in Whitman. However,
this Article worries about mixed messages. First, while the foundational
cases clearly purport to create federal common law, that creation sits in
considerable tension with other federal decisions and the sentiments of many
of the Justices, including Justice Powell—the author of two of the seminal
insider trading cases. Moreover, the key cases both ignore state law and rely
upon it, enhancing the confusing nature of those cases and making it difficult
to rely on such cases to refute claims that state law should not dictate the
contours of fiduciary relationships. Second, the rationales being uplifted to
support federal law—taken to their logical extensions—could crowd out
important state law rules and resources. States have a legitimate policy
interest in policing fiduciary breaches stemming from insider trading
violations. Justifications that do not appropriately account for that interest
may be particularly problematic. The ultimate goal should be to pinpoint
some rationale that acknowledges the important role of state law while
uplifting the goals of the federal securities laws in general and the insider
trading laws in particular. The “topsy turvy” nature of insider trading law
makes this a vexing task.
246. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
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This Article’s core thesis highlights the difficulties with pinpointing a
convincing rationale for the presumption of federal law on the question of
the fiduciary relationship. The Article offers the possibility of certainty as
an alternative rationale. In making this offering, this Article notes that
perhaps we should refrain from seeking to pinpoint a guiding principle that
answers all of the insider trading conundrums. In this spirit, this Article
indicates that certainty may provide a workable answer to the fiduciary
relationship question, at least to the extent that the question involves an issue
of coverage.

